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Human error is a byproduct of the human activity and may results in random unintended events; they may have
major consequences when it comes to delivery of medicine. Furthermore the causes of error in surgical practice are
multifaceted and complex. This article aims to raise awareness for safety measures in the cardiac surgical room and
briefly “touch upon” the human factors that could lead to adverse outcomes. Finally, we describe a model that
would enable us to depict and study adverse events in the operating theatre.
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Human factors (HF) is concerned with the ‘fit’ between
the user, equipment and their environments. It takes ac-
count of the user's capabilities and limitations in seeking
to ensure that tasks, functions, information and the
environment suit each user. With other words HF is a
concept that encompasses the science of understand-
ing the properties of human capability, the application
of this capacity to the design and engineering and
lastly the capability of ensuring optimal application of
human factors integration to a program.
Analysis of HF is a discipline that spans various fields
and emerges specifically in response to the safety con-
cerns of multi high-risk industries. Although theoretic-
ally based, it has a resolutely practical emphasis, always
aiming to bridge the gap between theory and application.
HF thinking is now applied to healthcare in a variety of
ways. Recently, a report by The World Health Organisation
[1] published a 19-item Surgical-Safety-Checklist, which
outlines safety checks and recommends performing at
specific-task of the patients surgical journey.
The aim of checklist-implementation was to change
surgical-systems and team -behavior.
Behavioral outcomes in the operating theatre
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reproduction in any medium, provided the ororganization and protocol implementation as well as op-
timal knowledge of the task referred to, are important as
simply seen when one defines the difference between
mistake an error: A mistake which means “wrongly taken”
is a wrong response that if you thought about it you would
realize is wrong. An error which means “to wander or
stray” is a wrong response because you have no knowledge
about what the right answer is. With other wards a person
if given a second chance has the potential to correct a mis-
take, whereas a person has no potential to correct an error
until he learns what is correct.
In such a volatile environment mistakes and their
precursors are waiting to occur; More than 50% of
surgical adverse events occur in theatre [2] whereas
half could have been prevented with simple-measures.
As per Wiegmann [3] about 60% of surgical errors were
picked up and managed immediately by the surgical team.
It is interesting that of these errors, 32% were events
during which the team experienced difficulty performing
a specific technique or procedure.
Adverse events are caused by decisions taken by per-
sons at the delivery end of a system or are results of
deficiencies in the organizational and management level
of the system.
Surgical error may occur when lack of skill or ability is
combined with behavioral deficiency. What we mean
with this statement? Well, when the knowledge or the
skills required for a given procedure are lacking and
despite this, for example the leading surgeon is deciding
to undertake the procedure with no safety backup. WithLtd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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limitations can lead to misjudgment and adversity.
Skill-based errors were thought to be the most com-
mon type of unsafe acts in theatre [4] followed by
changing or bending the predetermined rules in under
pressure circumstances.
Reasons “swiss cheese” model illustrates that the
organizational influence (climate, resource management,
and policies) impact supervisory processes (scheduling,
training, and oversight), which in turn establish the pre-
conditions (technological and teamwork related) that
produce errors.
The Human Factor Analysis Classification System
(HFACS) framework was developed using over 300 naval
aviation accidents obtained from the US Naval Safety
Center.
Based on HFACS, questions were developed to target
each of the causal categories within the HFACS by
ElBardissi et al. [4]. With other words this group have
tested the application of HFACS in Cardiac surgery.
When asked in an open-ended manner to characterize
surgeon personality and its reflection in the operating
theatre environment, 35% of individuals stated that sur-
geons are arrogant or demeaning, negatively affecting
team function, 24% stated that surgeons have a strong or
intense personality, also negatively affecting team func-
tion. Therefore, in this report with regards to teamwork
issues, 59% of responders indicated that a surgeon’s per-
sonality (by means of surgeons misbehavior in theatre),
negatively affects the way the surgical team functions,
Because the surgeon’s leadership and team-ness are
hugely important [5], many institutions have attempted
to address this issue of occurred behavior by sending
surgeons to charm school in order to improve their atti-
tude in the operative room; this is an interesting point
and has to be taken seriously from our senior colleagues.
However, the exact role of teamwork in error causation
is unclear, emphasizing the importance of additional re-
search in this area before implementing interventions
that have no scientific basis.
Although it is unlikely that one’s innate personality
can be changed it is undoubtedly possible to alter as-
pects of behavior, which impact negatively on colleagues
and on the team in the work place. With appropriate
training, individuals can improve and thus function
more effectively as part of a multidisciplinary team.
Major and minor events represent various types of
human errors. Those events have been elegantly defined
and extensively studied [6]. Minor events are errors that
alone were not expected to have serious consequences
for the patient; these included instrument handing,
errors by the scrub nurse, or communication prob-
lems in the theater team. Major events are more ser-
ious errors, such as for example, accidental injury ofa coronary artery and severe laceration of the aorta
during canulation.
The surgeon’s diagnostic skill, knowledge of the various
maneuvers to rectify problems, and communication with
the team are important prerequisites of compensation.
Uncompensated major events have a detriment outcome.
If each of them is appropriately compensated, however,
death can be avoided. Minor events are different. They
are less apparent and insidious, and many of them are
not even noticed by the operators. They are independent
of case complexity and correlate with “lack of flow”,
distractions and lack of communication in the opera-
tive theatre. More specifically Barach et al. [6] in a pro-
spective observational study of one hundred two patients
undergoing pediatric cardiac surgery, they analyzed minor
and major events; the surgeon wore a video head-camera
so that observers could also follow the surgical steps. The
observers created a handwritten observational tool to
document the surgical flow. A median of 1.1 major events
(range 0–6) occurred per case; with 43% of the major
events observed to occur when the aortic cross clamp is
release and is followed by weaning and separation from
CPB. A median of 18.3 minor events (range 2–54) oc-
curred per case, most often during CPB. This study
revealed that adverse events occurred regularly during
cardiac surgery and moreover that case complexity
and duration were significant predictors of major adverse
events, which in turn correlates with adverse outcome. On
the other hand, reactive than pre-emptive compensatory
mechanisms were detected in 98% of major events and
90% of minor events.The RECORD model
In order to identify the failed or absent defenses on the
chain that leads to unsafe acts and sentinel events we
hypothesize and presenting here a model that maybe
have a practical application in safe delivery of surgical
care.
We need to outline here that this is a preliminary re-
port of the model, which recently started to evaluate its
feasibility in practice.
The model proposed is based in the abundance literature
that suggests that surgical practice should be reported,
evaluated and one should reflect on it.
Furthermore the model takes into consideration the
visual grading of a procedure; either with the use of
“human observers” specialists to the procedure in question
able to grade it, or the use of a video camera recording.
Lastly the model aim to use two more tools: audit
forums and morbidity and mortality meetings and the
use of questioners with a five point Likert scale based
on frequency of occurrence (always= 5, very often= 4,
sometimes= 3, rarely= 2, never= 1).
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tempt to answer two aspects:
Firstly, we will be looking into reporting unsafe acts
(Classified as per HFACS) by means of registering
various errors:
1) “Thinking” errors as intended behavior that proceeds
as designed, yet the plan proves inadequate for the
situation.
2) Poorly executed procedures,
3) Improper choices
4) Misinterpretation of relevant information.
5) Skill-based errors: by examining the technique with
which one performs a task. These errors frequently
appear as forgotten intentions, and omitted items
during procedures.
6) Perceptual errors: Errors arise when sensory input is
degraded. Faced with acting on imperfect or
incomplete information, OR staff run the risk of
misjudging procedures as well as responding
incorrectly to a variety of stimuli.
7) “Bending the rules.” This type of violation is habitual
by nature.
And secondly we will be evaluating if CABG surgery in
practice is adherent to principles and local protocols.
The next step would be to add a questioner to target
each of the causal categories within the HFACS
structure:
1. Organizational structure and Resource management.
2. Structural supervision: management of personnel,
and resources, including training, guidance, and
leadership.
3. Problem correction: Instances when deficiencies
among individuals, equipment, training, or other
safety areas are “known” to the supervisor, yet
allowed to continue.
4. Inappropriate operations: Management of work,
including aspects of risk management and crew pairing.
5. Technological environment: Design of equipment
and controls, display-interface characteristics,
checklist layouts, task factors, and automation.
6. Physical environment: The operational setting and
the ambient environment, such as heat and lighting.
7. Adverse mental states: Psychological and (or) mental
conditions, such as fatigue, pernicious attitudes, and
misplaced motivation, that negatively affect
performance.
8. Adverse physiological states: Medical and/or
physiological conditions such as illness, intoxication,
and pharmacological or medical abnormalities
known to affect performance.
9. Physical/mental limitations: Physical/mental
disabilities, such as poor vision, lack of skill,
aptitude, knowledge, and other mental illnesses.10. Teamwork: Communication, coordination, and
other teamwork issues
11. Personal readiness: Off-duty activities and other
mandates, required to perform optimally.
The last step of the model would be to use a Video
camera recording randomly and human factor specialists.
Implementation all the steps of the RECORD model
may be cumbersome and preliminary results are not out
yet however we believe that this multifaceted approach
may allow us to capture and study “ adverse events in
cardiac theatre” in order to improve HF. In Figure 1
an algorithm to stepwise investigations of adverse effects
in theatre is given. In Table 1, the principles of the
RECORD model are depicted.Discussion
In an elegant study by de Leval et al. [7], a table of hypo-
thetical perioperative scenarios with a various types of
errors in the cardiothoracic operating environment are
presented, in a didactic way. The authors, outline the
fact that error detection should be the first step in error
handling; moreover, that there is a suggestive evidence
on the direct influence of the number of minor events
per case and their impact to adverse outcomes.
The Northern New England Cardiovascular Disease
Study Group is a learning collaborative, that has com-
pletely devoted to improving performance of cardiac sur-
gery. By using the tools that we have alluded to, albeit
focusing on quantitative outcome data they have been
able to produce the best outcomes across the entire 12
hospital network (Full publication list at: http://www.
nnecdsg.org/pub_lit_2.htm).
Furthermore there are a number of publications
whereby various authorities have done an extraordinary
amount of work on improving adult and pediatric
cardiac surgery performance and should be cited here
[8,9]. The authors summarize the lessons that have been
learned about critical incident and near-miss reporting
in other high technology industries that are pertinent
to cardiac surgery.
Critical incident and near miss reporting that is based
on human error taxonomies is in its infancy in the field
of cardiac surgery [8]. However, monitoring near misses
[7] can provide early indication of deterioration in surgical
performance. Furthermore it is important to outline that
the hospital with the highest mortality rate [8] also had a
high failure-to-rescue rate, suggesting that there were
problems in the management of difficult complications.
Failure to rescue a patient might therefore be an appro-
priate measure of “inadequate organizational performance”.
A “Centralized cardiac registry” of major events and near
misses, whereby incidences in cardiac theatres should be
First Step
Report Technical failures, administrative /organizational failures or 
human failures and violations. 
Evaluate A given surgical practice should be adherent to principles 
and protocols; 
Questionnaires
The use of questionnaires: refer to individual’s well- being, 
experience, knowledge and confidence; or it could refer to the 
organizational characteristics of the theatre team on action.
Questionnaires for the medical & nursing staff once every 6 months 
Good surgical practice: regular random grading of competence of surgical tasks 
(cannulation of the aorta, coronary anastomotic  techniques, valve implantation etc)    
Failures: Identification of minor and major failures and reporting
Video camera recording randomly 
Human factor specialists
Next step
Figure 1 An algorithm for investigating adverse events in the operating theatre.
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avoidance” may become a helpful tool.
In a series of 24 successful operations Catchpole et al.
[10] 366 failures when check lists, notes and video re-
cordings were employed. Interestingly, skill, knowledge
and decision making failures were only a small percent-
age of the failures; furthermore Longer and more risky
operations were likely to generate a greater number of
minor failures than shorter and lower risk operations
The same authors [11] by using a validated scale
adapted from research in aviation they looked at the
ability of a team to work safely; they concluded that
decreasing the number of minor problems can lead to
a smoother, safer and sorter operation.
Schraagen et al. [12] in an elegant report and rigorous
work they trained human factors observers to observeand code the non-routine events and teamwork from
time of arrival of the patient into the operating room to
the patient handover in the intensive care unit. The
authors concluded [13] that their suggested trained
model it is ideal to explore team performance.
Using trained human factor observers [14] 40 paediatric
cardiac cases were observed using both quantitative and
qualitative measures. The important results of this study
showed that surgeons displayed better teamwork during
complicated procedures and also that more procedural
non-routine events were associated with more compli-
cated postoperative course.
Bognar et al. [15] using the power of a survey amongst
paediatric cardiac surgery team members found that
Staffing levels, equipment availability, production pressures,
and hectic schedules were concerns. More interesting
Table 1 Depicting and studying “events in theatre” in order to improve human factors: the “RECORD” model
The “RECORD” model
Report In Incident Reporting systems, error should be categorized according to the source of it; so errors can be occur due
to technical failures administrative and organizational failures or human failures and violations. However regardless of
its source, the correct approach to human error recognizes the need for reporting and reflecting on them. Analysis of
human factors means encouraging error reporting in a non-punitive environment, where it is seen as a valuable
source of information, facilitating education and future error prevention.
Evaluate Constant grading of theatre activity can be achieved by Evaluation as to whether a given surgical practice is adherent
to principles and protocols; for example prior to chest closure the team asks the anesthetist to make sure that the
Swan-Ganz catheter is mobile and is not “caught up” with the atrial sutures; or when requesting for a IABP support
the balloon size has to be double checked by perfusionists and surgeons; A patient with an air leak who comes to
theatre for a VATS pleurectomy should not have the drain removed up till the chest is open for the simple risk of
tension pneumothorax.
Centralize Creation of a “Centralized cardiac registry” of major events and near misses, whereby incidences in cardiac theatres
should be reported and should be used as “learning examples for avoidance”.
Observe Observers: “Human factor specialists” should be experts to the procedures involved: this is an important concept
because a commonly predictable event such as for example, inability to be weaned off Cardiopulmonary bypass first
time due to air embolism in the coronaries could be criticized as a near miss event from an inexperienced eye.
Record with Video camera Video camera Recordings; it is been used in other specialized areas such as during performance of highly skilled
actions in aviation. It is somehow difficult to appreciate as to how it could be an established monitoring tool in the
operating theatre, however one has to appreciate that it provides an objective index of a performance and a
reflecting tool to refer to.
Dual action: Audit and
Questionnaires
Regular clinical audit forums whereby the current surgical practice is scrutinized against protocols; this is an essential
component of the “smooth implementation” of surgical practices and provides room for improvement by identifying
human errors and eventually correcting them by “closing the audit loop”.
The use of questionnaires: They are helpful in depicting surgical practices. A direct questioner to the surgical team
could potentially refer to individual’s well- being, experience, knowledge and confidence; or it could refer to the
organizational characteristics of the theatre team on action. Human factors questionnaires should be “filled in” before
or during the procedure, but not afterward, to prevent hindsight bias.
“RECORD” stands for:
R: Report, E: Evaluate, C: Centralize, O: Observe, R: Record with video.
& D: Dual action: Audit and questionnaires’.
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often disregarded.
It has wrongly been perceived by few [16], that surgi-
cal skills are innate aspects of ones personality; they can
neither be taught nor acquired. In this context, we
should differentiate between ‘innate ability or aptitude’,
which an individual is born with and brings to particular
tasks, and ‘skill’, in execution, which is acquired by train-
ing and reinforcement. Furthermore, whilst some indi-
viduals seem to be able to acquire these skills easier,
many others could have these skills improved by length-
ier training. On their own, however, knowledge or skills
are not enough. For example, there are trainee surgeons
who are well informed on the surgical literature but are
less than adequate in the operating room. Contrary,
there are surgeons whom are technically expert but con-
sistently fail to get the results that would be expected
from such expertise.
Surgeons with the “right knowledge and technical ex-
pertise” get better outcomes because they operate on the
right patients the right time, continue to perform under
stress and they manage to successfully harness the sup-
port of a multidisciplinary team to get the best results. It
is well known that Crew resource management skills
(how to manage/guide the theatre team) are particularlyimportant for cardiac surgeons. This is one of the WHO
checklist emphasis points.
It has been hypothesized [17] that only 25% of the im-
portant events, which occur during a surgical procedure,
are related to manual-technical skills and that 75% relate
to decision-making (especially during crises), communi-
cation, teamwork and leadership. Other HF, which are
important in surgical practice, include self-awareness
(i.e. insight), conflict resolution and error management.
For example ‘task conflicts’ the “who, what, when and
why” between the various theatre teams should be settling
easily without escalation to an argument.
Causes of accidents in aviation industry are primarily
related to deficiencies in nontechnical skills, rather
than a lack of technical expertise. Flin et al. [18] in an
elegant review elaborates on Crew Resource Manage-
ment (CRM) courses as an educational tool to improve
aviational safety; The four primary categories subdivide
into two social skills (Co-operation; Leadership and
Management) and two cognitive skills (Situation Aware-
ness; Decision Making). Lack of nontechnical skills, have
also been studied during surgical procedures, with great
interest [13].
In this editorial we are projected an idea based in
numerous and very important research in the topic of
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national registry of “events”. That could be subdivided
as per “severity of the events”. In addition, we are
taking into consideration simple reporting mechanisms-
questioners, together with real perioperative data acquisi-
tion. That may enable us to scrutinize surgical practice
and also test the implementation and validity of cardiac
surgical protocols.
Limitations of applying “various systems” in clinical
practice
Under-reporting [19] of incidents is a limiting factor
that unfortunately it relates to the old notion of “a
blame culture” in medicine; it is inappropriate, when
junior doctors do not report incidents [20] because they
fear they will be blamed. Equally it is wrong when they
are blamed by senior colleagues; under the circum-
stances the team should be united to investigate and
learn from the errors.
The obligation to name and define the role of the per-
son reporting the incident can be a restrictive factor for
reporting; it is apparent that confidentiality encourages
an easier reporting procedure and probably should be
implemented when possible. Moreover, the retrospective
nature of reporting incidences further necessitates their
need for validation and accuracy.
Clear definitions of [8] near misses in cardiac surgery
is complicated by the need to distinguish between those
events against serious peri-operative and post- operative
complications. This can only be achieved when the
human factors observers are trained and familiar with
the procedures under investigation. With other words
standardized training and calibration of observers would
improve the data collection.
The capture of adverse actions and events are subjective
and depend on the observers training and education;
therefore, depicting accurately data in this respect could
be limiting by interpreter reliability. Moreover, there are
many technical challenges when video taping surgical
teams such as logistics, ethics and interpretation [12].
Weaknesses in using video for data include lengthy
video review processes, poor audio, and the inability to
adequately analyze events outside the field of view [21].
The development and implementation of a system
for measuring technical performance in the operating
theatre is difficult. The challenges of grading the technical
expertise, has been addressed by Karamichalis et al. [22].
An individual practitioner’s surgical performance includes
the technical domain and other nontechnical skills such as
cognitive flexibility, decision-making etc.
Technical performance, is defined as “the adequacy
of the surgical anatomic repair intended,” and as per
Larrazabal et al. [23] intraoperative technical perform-
ance is one of the most important, if not the mostimportant, parts of the therapeutic process and deter-
mines postoperative outcomes. None of the currently
available quality monitoring tools measures technical
performance; the authors created and validated a scor-
ing tool in this respect; the limitations of their tool is
however due to the fact that in their model “rating sur-
gical adequacy” is based on ECHO, which creates the
biases of the operator dependent technique.
Lastly, using models for reducing errors may be part
of the solution; as per Auroy et al. [24] risk assess-
ment and control require analysis of both outcomes
and process of care.
We admit into several limitations of this report. The
model reported here is more of a zealous and enthusias-
tic project, in an attempt to capture more accurately, the
already well defined many aspects of human factors in
the cardiothoracic environment.
The first attempt of implementing a robust model
was conceived by our team, following few years of
using Briefing and debriefing in the cardiac operating
room, in a manner similar to the model reported by
Papaspyros et al. [25] with satisfactory outcomes (un-
published results).
We need to clarify here, that we conceived the idea
of the RECORD model in an attempt to put more var-
iables together in a continuous fashion. With other
words, we would try to compile a “feedback approach”
by the staff involved in the theatre environment together
with the “specialists reporting approach” of the human
factor observers in a stepwise fashion.
We would also like to confess, that we are still work-
ing to make the questioners simple and reproducible, for
easy use.
So overall, this is a preliminary idea that we are work-
ing to materialize.
Lastly, in this editorial we hypothesized that putting
more variables together we will be able to overcome
some of the limitations to human factor research and
analysis of performance assessment; although we just
initiate implementing our model in clinical practice we
hope that we will be back with real world data analysis
in order to be able to depict and act upon clusters of
latent errors before they become active. We are hop-
ing to show in a subsequent study by piloting this
model, that we will be able to support the basic idea
of the model (more variables, more feedback, less bias)
for others to emulate.
Conclusions
The ability to manage errors and unexpected events
successfully during an operation is a marker of surgi-
cal excellence.
By enlarge, imminent errors include such factors as
fatigue, communication or patient related factors, such
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organizational matters such as shift patterns and staffing.
If we are pursuing perfection, then we ought to review
and reflect in each case, both early after the operation
and later in follow-up, to determine which aspects of
the management could be improved. The RECORD
model is a “conceived idea” that is taking into consider-
ation all the hard work that has been done in the field
of human factors the last 25–30 years. We are hoping
to finalize and validate the model under the principles
of: use simple variables, straight forward feedback real
time observational approach with elimination of bias;
however the model needs to be clinically implemented,
before we conclude that may improve clinical governance.
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